Enclosure 1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CENTRAL REFERENCE ADVISORY GROUP

Logging of Classified Intelligence Information Reports

1. Problem

To determine the minimal requirements for logging classified (except TOP SECRET) intelligence information reports within the CIA so as to meet the requirements of E.O. 10501 and the approval of the Office of Security.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem

- a. E.O. 10501 requires that "proper control of dissemination of classified defense information shall be maintained at all times, including good accountability records..."
- b. CIA Regulation Section 0, Maintenance of Logs, requires that "all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material will be logged in at the initial point of receipt in an Office, and will be logged cut at the final point of dispatch when bound for distribution outside the Office or Mivision level; or when dispatched to a field office between sub-divisions of an office located in different buildings."
- c. The present practice in CIA for logging the COMFIDENTIAL and SECRET reports in question varies from office to office and between components within the offices. In some offices, logs are maintained for recording the receipt and dispatch by the Office, the Division, the Branch and even the Section while in others such record keeping is limited to the Office or no logging records are kept at all. One fact is clear; at some point in the distribution system the logging records are discontinued and "control" of the document from them on is entirely a matter of individual memory and the regular security habits practiced in that area.

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- d. The Document Division, OCR, maintains a record of receipt for documents it receives for dissemination as well as a record of the distribution made of the copies.
- e. Copies of intelligence information reports are furnished from the CIA Library aperture card file when requested and copies of these requests are filed for record purposes.
- f. Copies of reports are also made by the several offices for individual purposes by thermofax or other process and generally speaking no logging record of such reproduced copies is maintained.

3. Discussion

- a. The complete lack of any definitive instructions, as to the content, format, and use of logs for SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material, has resulted in different emphasis and interpretation in each Agency component. As a consequence, the procedures and the types of material logged vary widely. Unquestionably there should be a uniform application of the logging requirement by each component.
- b. Only limited security accountability is provided by logging SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents from component to component, as compared to the person to person logging required for TS material. In the case of component to component logging, the measure of accountability and the cost of the logging increase in a pyramidal effect with each lower organizational level to which it is applied. In arriving at some balance of this cost and accountability, the organizational level for logging is established at the Office and Area Division level by regulation. However, it does not appear that this across-the-board requirement should necessarily be applied to the classified intelligence information reports disseminated throughout the Agency by OCR.
- c. No question is raised with the regulatory concept of logging, as spplied to material forwarded from one office to another. In these cases, the logging function is placed at the office level and is therefore at the highest possible organizational level. This represents the minimum in logging (and cost) that could be required and still have an intra Agency security accountability system.

- d. The classified material disseminated by OCR does, however, raise a question. OCR maintains a record of the receipt and distribution of all copies of classified material disseminated within the Agency. This record identifies the document and shows the date and the number of copies forwarded to each component. The Office or Area Division log, in addition to the OCR record, imposes the pyramiding cost effect without a commensurate gain in accountability. For example: (1) Cost -OCR receives, records and disseminates a monthly load of approximately 30,000 documents (about 500,000 copies) the majority of which are classified SECREF or CONFIDENTIAL. These documents are disseminated to several different points through the appropriate information control offices. A copy of every document does not go to each information control office. But assuming it required two persons to log the receipt and distribution of material received at each information control point, we believe a total of 36 persons would be a conservative estimate for the personnel requirements to perform this chore. (The 18 main control points are OCI (2); ORR (2); OBI; ONE; OSI; OIS, DD/P (10).) At the base of a GS-5, this amounts to a cost of \$145,440; (2) Accountability -The OCR record shows the number of copies forwarded to each component. The Office level log can add the internal routing but this does not materially narrow the field of responsibility for three reasons (a) internal routing is to lower components not persons, (b) there is no control on further internal rerouting and (c) practically all components have memerous reproduction devices.
- e. Another pertinent point is that copies of such documents are available from OCR and could be used in re-establishing the original dissemination by reprocessing under controlled conditions.
- f. The National Security Agency Collection Branch maintains a "master" record for recording the receipt of collatoral documents from outside agencies and for recording the distribution made within NSA of the copies involved. The several agency elements receive the copies on a retain or destroy basis and are not required to keep track of their receipt or further distribution. If NSA considers the "master" record as satisfying the accountability provision of E.O. 10501, it would appear to be a good argument to adopt a similar procedure for CIA.

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4. Conclusion


Office and Area Division logs for SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material disseminated by OCR represents a substantial cost in money and ceiling positions which are unwarranted in view of the limited additional security accountability that they provide.

5. Recommendation

Revise Regulation Section 0, to except from the Office and Area Division logging requirements all OCR disseminated material classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL.

Concurrence:

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